The idea of the winner’s curse can be expressed slightly differently from its usage in the chapter: “The only time your bid matters is when you win, which happens when your estimate is higher than the estimates of all the other bidders. Therefore you should focus on this case. That is, you should always act as if all the others have received estimates lower than yours, and use this ‘information’ to revise your own estimate.” Here we ask you to apply this idea to a very different situation. A jury consists of 12 people who hear and see evidence presented at a trial and collectively reach a verdict of guilt or innocence. Simplifying the process somewhat, assume that the jurors hold a single simultaneous vote to determine the verdict. Each juror is asked to vote Guilty or Not guilty. The accused is convicted if all 12 vote Guilty and is acquitted if one or more vote Not guilty; this is known as the unanimity rule. Each juror’s objective is to arrive at a verdict that is the most accurate verdict in light of the evidence, but each juror interprets the evidence in accord with her own thinking and experience. Thus, she arrives at an estimate of the guilt or the innocence of the accused that is individual and private.

(a) If jurors vote truthfully—that is, in accordance with their individual private estimates of the guilt of the accused—will the verdict be Not guilty more often under a unanimity rule or under a majority rule, where the accused is convicted if seven jurors vote Guilty? Explain. What might we call the “juror’s curse” in this situation?

(b) Now consider the case in which each juror votes strategically, taking into account the potential problems of the juror’s curse and using all the devices of information inference that we have studied. Are individual jurors more likely to vote Guilty under a unanimity rule when voting truthfully or strategically? Explain.

(c) Do you think strategic voting to account for the juror’s curse would produce too many Guilty verdicts? Why or why not?