| Due Date | Friday of Week 3, April 19th | |
| Conceptual Background | Read Hardin and either (1) Wade or (2) Seabright (more theoretical than Wade; Seabright uses theory of repeating cooperative and noncooperative games). | |
| Application.
Either one is required of all students. |
Read either (1) Acheson or (2) Cinner | |
| Conceptual Assignment Reading.
Required of all students. |
Hardin, G. 1968. “Tragedy of the Commons.” Science, 162: 1243-1248. | |
| Conceptual Assignment Reading.
Read this or Seabright. |
Wade, R. 1987. “The Management of Common Property Resources: Finding a Cooperative Solution.” World Bank Research Observer 2(2): 219-234.
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| Conceptual Assignment Reading.
Read this or Wade. |
Seabright, P. “Managing Local Commons: Theoretical Issues in Incentive Design.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 7(4): 113-134. | |
| Application Assignment Reading.
Read this or Cinner.
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Acheson J. 1975. “The Lobster Fiefs: Economic and Ecological Effects of Territoriality in the Marine Lobster Industry.” Human Ecology 3:183-207. | |
| Application Assignment Reading.
Read this or Acheson. |
Cinner, J. 2005. “Socio-Economic Factors Influencing Customary Marine Tenure in the Indo-Pacific. Ecology and Society 10(1):1-36.
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| Assignment | 4-page paper (typed, double spaced, 12 Arial font, 1” margins) discussing the possible use of common property to address the commons problem.
Please develop your discussion within the context of either (1) Acheson and the lobster fiefs or (2) Cinner and customary marine tenure in the Indo-Pacific. Note: you don’t have to read Acheson if you read Cinner and vice versa, but in either case you should show evidence of having read Hardin and either Wade or Seabright.
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