Suppose you’re bidding against just one opponent whose value is uniformly distributed on [0, 1], and who always bids half her value. What is the probability that you will win if you bid b 5 0.1? If you bid b 5 0.4? If you bid b 5 0.6? September 2, 2021 Read More »
Use a similar approach to that of Exercise S4. Remember that in an all-pay auction, you pay your bid even when you lose, so your payoff is v 2 b when you win, and 2b when you lose. September 2, 2021 Read More »
Which bidder wins an open-outcry English auction? What are the final price paid and the profit to the winning bidder? September 2, 2021 Read More »
If you bid $110 million for the company, your bid will surely succeed. Is your expected profit positive? September 2, 2021 Read More »
Do you think strategic voting to account for the juror’s curse would produce too many Guilty verdicts? Why or why not? September 2, 2021 Read More »
This exercise is a continuation of Exercise S4; it looks at the general case where n is any positive integer. September 2, 2021 Read More »
Consider the bargaining situation between Compaq Computer Corporation and the California businessman who owned the Internet address www.altavista.com.15 Compaq, September 2, 2021 Read More »
Two hypothetical countries, Euphoria and Militia, are holding negotiations to settle a dispute. September 2, 2021 Read More »
Recall the variant of the pizza pricing game in Exercise U2, part (b), in Chapter 10, in which one store (Donna’s Deep Dish) was much larger than the other (Pierce’s Pizza Pies). September 2, 2021 Read More »
Consider two players who bargain over a surplus initially equal to a whole-number amount V, using alternating offers. September 2, 2021 Read More »