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Recall the hybrid behavioral dynamics contemplated in Subsection

 

12.4.3 for the context in which a bilateral coordination game is played under  centralized interaction. There, player 1was postulated to adjust her behavior through

myopic best response (i.e., according to (12.36)), whereas players 2 through n

were assumed imitators among themselves (i.e., behave as in (12.35)). Apply the

same behavioral mixture to the Cournot context described in Subsection 12.4.5.1;

i.e., suppose firm 1 behaves according to (12.5) and firms 2 through behave according

to (12.3). Characterize the stochastically stable states of the (perturbed)

evolutionary process thus induced.

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